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Introduction
Present-day English features variation in infinitival complements in English periphrastic causatives, some of them taking a bare, others, a to-infinitive: 1 (1) He had his secretary order some coffee, then closed the door and sat down behind his desk. (BNC ECK 2589) 2 (2) The police got him to confess to the crime. (BNC HXG 799) Before c1800 these constructions generally occurred with both infinitival modes (cf. e.g. 'Lo the traitor, how he wanted to make her at last jump into pride.'
The question arises as to whether the distribution of bare and to-infinitives in causatives is random.
Formalists such as Zandvoort (1957: 4) , Andersson (1985: 12) , Buyssens (1987: 341), Lehrer (1987: 256) and (implicitly) Huddleston (1971: 165) have argued that the two infinitival strategies are merely structural variants, so one would expect their answer to be in the positive. By contrast, the functionalist tenet that formal differences will tend to correspond to functional differences (e.g. Bolinger 1977 : x, Haiman 1985 ) would suggest a negative answer. The present study takes this latter perspective. Specifically, I will argue that the Present-day English situation (and its diachronic development) is to an important extent motivated (iconically) by semantics. In addition to the semantic basis I suggest that one must also take account of grammaticalisation, in particular the compacting effect of (high) token frequency (cf. e.g. Zipf 1935, Bybee and Hopper 2001) . 4 This study focuses on English but it has wider relevance. This is because, first, the semantic motivation invoked is grounded in typological(ly-oriented) work (Dixon 1991 , Fillmore 1972 , Givón 1975 , Talmy 1976 , 1988 , Verhagen and Kemmer 1997 , Wierzbicka 1975 ) and second, frequency effects in grammaticalisation are not restricted to English but apply universally.
Section 2 surveys previous scholarship on infinitival complementation in English causatives, starting with primarily synchronic work (Mittwoch 1990 , Dixon 1991 , Duffley 1992 , then moving on to Fischer's work (1992b Fischer's work ( , 1995 Fischer's work ( , 1996 Fischer's work ( , 1997a Fischer's work ( , 1997b , which is historical but also has implications for Present-day English. Finally I discuss Givón's (1980) typological study on the binding hierarchy -the starting point of my own account. Very briefly, (semantic) binding refers to the degree to which two clauses are conceptualised as representing a single integrated event. Section 3 extends Givón's binding hierarchy in directions particularly relevant to causatives and explains how it relates to the bare vs marked infinitive distinction in Present-day English. The diachronic dimension is also brought in, very briefly (a more comprehensive discussion is offered in Hollmann 2003: Ch.6). Section 4 wraps up the discussion by determining to what extent the extended binding hierarchy and frequency constitute an improvement on the explanations offered by previous scholarship. : Mittwoch, Dixon, Duffley Duffley (1992) is the most comprehensive functionalist account of Present-day English infinitival marking. Not restricting himself to causatives, he also includes other verbs that display variation, e.g. help (Duffley 1992: 23-29) and perception verbs (ibid.: 29-47). In fact his scope is even larger, also including verbs that feature variation between infinitives and other complementation strategies such as that-clauses (e.g. know, 1992: 48-56) and uses of the (to-)infinitive where it is not dependent on another verb, e.g. when it is used as a subject (ibid.: 126-132).
Previous scholarship
Present-day English
Duffley's study is essentially a monosemy approach to the bare vs to-infinitive distinction: he proposes that both strategies are associated with a single basic function, related to tense. Specifically, the to-infinitive is said to evoke the presence of a distinct "beforeposition" and "after-position" (Duffley 1992: 17 and passim) , which is absent in the bare infinitive. For complex sentences, the idea is thus that the lower clause to-infinitival event is seen as temporally removed from the main clause event, whereas the bare infinitive conveys the idea of coincidence.
For causatives, the presence vs absence of a before vs after frame is described as "antecedent vs concurrent causation" (Duffley 1992: 68) In (5) there is "'antecedent' causality, the cause being represented as prior to the effect" (Duffley 1992: 63) ; in (6) , the causing and caused events are conceptualised as occurring simultaneously (ibid.: 64). Now while this might seem an attractive analysis for these examples it cannot be the whole story. Consider the following example from the British National Corpus: (7) He had his secretary order some coffee, then closed the door and sat down behind his desk. (BNC ECK 2589) Rather than describing two simultaneous events, (7) portrays a situation where the secretary orders the coffee only after her boss makes the request.
As for the other two accounts to be included here, Duffley actually mentions Mittwoch (1990) , in connection to a less than helpful suggestion by Dixon (1984) on have and make (Dixon has more to say in his (1991) grammar of English; see below):
It has been suggested (Dixon 1984: 586) that the omission of to here 'may just be an irregularity with a diachronic explanation -like the plural of mouse being mice -that has simply to be learnt by users'. As Mittwoch (1990: 125) (Duffley 1992: 56-57) This is a selective representation of Mittwoch's claims. For instance, in suggesting that to-infinitival complements have the "potential for independent temporal specification" (Mittwoch 1990 : 103, see also pp. 118, 125), she has actually anticipated Duffley's account (though her proposal may be slightly different in that her term "potential" presumably indicates that while the bare infinitive implies coincidence (for causatives: concurrent causation), the overtly marked strategy may, but need not imply temporal distance (antecedent causation)). 6 Dixon's (1991) account of the distribution of infinitival complements in periphrastic causatives focuses on cause, make and let. 7 The difference in complementation between cause and make is explained in terms of directness. Dixon's analysis of cause as indirect follows standard typological practice (e.g. Wierzbicka 1975) . Consider: (8) He caused Mary to crash by almost cutting through the brake cable and then sending her down the mountain road. (Dixon 1991: 194) This is a textbook example of indirect causation in that there is no unity of time, no unity of space, and some intermediary party  or in this case, state-of-affairs  in between causer and causee. (The intermediary situation is constituted by the acts described in the byphrase.) For this reason cause "naturally takes to" (Dixon 1991: 230) . Make, by contrast, "refer[s] to anything the Causer does to bring something about directly" (Dixon 1991: 194, cf. also p. 230), so it "naturally exclude[s] to" (ibid.). Concerning let, Dixon is less clear. On the one hand he includes it in his discussion of directness, but on the other, his semantic analysis does not correspond very well to the standard description of the direct vs indirect distinction in typology. The reason why, like make, it, too, is said to "naturally exclude to" (Dixon 1990: 230) is that " [l] et focuses on the main clause subject, and the effect it has on the subject of the complement clause".
I believe that directness indeed plays a role (see section 3, below Fischer's (1992b Fischer's ( , 1995 Fischer's ( , 1996 Fischer's ( , 1997a Fischer's ( and 1997b studies furnish the most complete treatment of the selection of bare vs to-infinitive from a historical perspective. Focusing especially on Middle English, she has argued against the view that the distinction is not functionally motivated (cf. e.g. Kenyon 1909 , Ohlander 1941 , Quirk and Svartvik 1970 , Visser 1973 , Warner 1982 and, to some extent, Jack 1991). (ii) the activity expressed in the infinitival clause is or is not directly perceivable
[the former being associated with the bare, the latter, with the to-infinitive,
WBH]
(iii) after causatives, the to-infinitive is used when the causation is in some way not direct, either because (a) the subject of the matrix verb (the causer) does
not concretely cause what is expressed in the infinitival clause, or (b) because the subject/causer is inanimate and as such more of an instrument than a cause, or (c) what is caused is a process in which the causee himself takes/must take an active part (iv) in general contexts, i.e., when the infinitival clause does not express an actuality, the to-infinitive is the rule (v) the zero infinitive is the rule in 'irrealis' constructions (vi) the to-infinitive is the rule when the infinitive or the matrix verb is in the passive form (Fischer 1995: 7-8) It is unnecessary to go into all these factors; suffice it to say that together they do a good job of accounting for the variation observed in her corpus (in Fischer 1995, the complete works of Chaucer and the Paston Letters; expanded in her (1996) study to include the Middle English part of the Helsinki Corpus as well as examples from other texts; see also e.g. the Old
English examples from van Kemenade (1993) in Fischer (1997a: 123) ). The reason why the rest of the discussion is restricted to only some of them is that not all the distinctions involved correspond to coding distinctions in causatives. That is, only some of these factors are ever expressed, cross-linguistically, by different causative constructions. In particular, factors (iv)-(vi) do not correspond to different causative constructions in English or any other language.
(They are included in Fischer's studies because she is concerned with explaining different choices made in discourse.) Thus, the meaning distinctions can be made across languages, but they are simply not expressed on the causative constructional level. Take factor (iv); Fischer mentions the use of some modal element such as an if-clause -I know of no language with a distributional difference among its causatives relative to this variable.
Factors (i)-(iii) are related to (semantic) typologies of causatives. Factor (i),
(non-)identity of tense domains, echoes Duffley's (1992) before vs after frame as well as the similar suggestion by Mittwoch (1990) . It is also one component of directness as defined by typologists, normally expressed as (presence vs absence of) unity of time (Wierzbicka 1975: 497-99).
As for factor (ii), Fischer suggests that it "concerns in the first place the complements of perception verbs" (1995: 9-10; her examples involve see, hear or feel). It is applicable to causatives as well, though, provided it is reformulated in terms of (presence vs absence of) unity of space/place (Wierzbicka 1975 : 494-495, cf. also Fillmore 1972 , the second component of directness recognised by typologists.
Fischer's factor (iiia) furnishes the third property of directness. Factor (iiib) is covered by Talmy's (1976 Talmy's ( , 1988 Talmy's ( , 2000 32). Extending this notion to causality in general is questionable.
Givón
Taking issue with the logic-based concepts of implicativity and factivity/presupposition, or rather with the traditionally hypothesised correlation between those and mode of complementation, Givón (1980) proposes the more general, not strictly logic-based, but crosslinguistically supported notion of binding. His study is not restricted to causatives but also includes "modality verbs" (want, succeed, fail, start, finish, etc.) and "cognition-utterance verbs" (know, think, say, etc.) (Givón 1980: 333) .
Binding has syntactic and semantic dimensions, correlating as follows: "The higher a verb is on the [semantic] binding scale, the less would its complement tend to be syntactically coded as an independent/main clause" (Givón 1980: 337) . Coding as an independent/main clause is analysed into three (cross-linguistically valid) properties:
The degree to which the agent/subject/topic marking of the embeddedclause agent/subject reflects the marking in independent main clauses (ii) The degree to which independent-clause tense-aspect-modality marking of the verb is preserved in the embedded clause
The presence or degree-of-presence of predicate-raising of the complement verb into the main verb; i.e. the degree to which the complement verb is lexicalized as one word with the main verb (Givón 1980: 337) Infinitival complements represent pretty extreme cases of the reduction of T-A-M (TenseAspect-Mood) marking (Givón 1980: 337) ; the bare infinitive being even more reduced (more bound syntactically to the matrix verb) than to-infinitives.
The relation between the formal and functional dimensions of binding is iconically motivated. Discussing the use of complementising subordinators Givón writes:
All other things being equal, the use of a subordinating morpheme which neatly separates the main clause from its complement clause is a coding acknowledgement that the two clauses are semantically still independent of each other, at least to some extent. (Givón 1980: 371) (11) I had her lose her temper by sending John over to taunt her (Givón 1975: 65) While this made-up example is not ungrammatical, it is marginal not prototypical (see further my FLOB Corpus analysis below). In other words, on the basis of Givón's parameters I would suggest a partial ordering with have and make outranking cause.
Incidentally, Duffley, in discussing Givón's study, agrees that "make and have (…) involve a closer bond [than cause] between the causative event and the event caused" (1992:
57). Duffley's motivation for not accommodating this insight into his own account is that he (mistakenly) sees Givón's parameters as being "based on abstract semantic categories which have been set up a priori in logico-truth-conditional terms" (Duffley 1992: 57) .
The extended binding hierarchy for implicative causatives
Givón's twin semantic parameters are not enough, consider e.g. force, which, like make (and have) is intended and direct, yet has a to-infinitive. In this section I first extend the binding hierarchy (subsection 3.1) and then score the Present-day English causatives cause, force, get, have, make and persuade (subsection 3.2).
Extending the binding hierarchy for implicative causatives
I propose to expand Givón's (1980) Duffley (1992) and Fischer (1992b Fischer ( , 1995 Fischer ( , 1996 Fischer ( , 1997a Fischer ( , 1997b ) I suggest that it plays a role in infinitive marking  indeed, in syntactic binding of complements to matrix verbs in general. Two events that occur (more or less) simultaneously are easier to construe as a single event than two events separated by a long interval.
Unity of space is the last component of directness. It often goes hand in hand with unity of time. It is surprising that it has not been mentioned explicitly in the literature on complementation in English causatives. However, it is possible to interpret Fischer's factor
(ii)  the possibility vs impossibility for the matrix clause subject to directly perceive the lower clause event  along these lines (cf. also Fischer 1994:95, 104-105) . The rationale behind including this property in the extended binding hierarchy is that if the caused event occurs at a spatial remove from the causing event, the two are harder to see as one than if they occur in the same place.
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Concerning (2), presence vs absence of a sphere of control frame refers to the question as to whether the causer is inherently superior (physically, socially, or whatever) to the causee. Givón (1980) invokes this notion relative to nonimplicative causatives, arguing that "non-implicative verbs can already be ranked according to Likelihood of manipulator's authority being challenged by the manipulee, with 'tell' coding less challenge and 'order', 'ask', 'demand' coding more" (Givón 1980 : 368, emphasis Givón's). I extend it to implicatives: a caused event occurring within the causer's SC is easier to think of as forming a single whole with the causing event than a caused event where the causee (potentially) challenges the causer (for more elaborate discussion of this parameter cf. Hollmann 2003:
Ch.3 and references cited therein).
As for (3), Verhagen and Kemmer (1997) propose an interesting interpretation of The nature of the interaction between causer and causee is interpreted in terms of more vs less direct causation. Directness is used here in a different sense from the typological definition above, but that should not detract from the value of the proposal:
An obviously important aspect of this model of causation types is the very marked asymmetry between entities with a mental dimension (animates) vs. those that are merely physical. Animates can only act on animates via the intervening physical world, i.e. the model implies that one cannot reach into another person's mind and directly cause him or her to do, feel, or think something. Physical entities are taken to act directly on other things; hence the straight arrows in the diagram in Fig. 1 , vs. the very bent arrow for mental-on-mental causation, and the slightly bent one for mental-on-physical. (Verhagen and Kemmer 1997: 71) Verhagen and Kemmer apply this to the Dutch causatives doen and laten, arguing that the former is associated with the most direct types, physical and affective causation, while the latter usually codes the prototypically indirect type, inducive causation (1997: 72): (12) De stralende zon doet de temperatuur oplopen. (Verhagen and Kemmer 1997: 62) the shining sun does the temperature rise 'The bright sun makes the temperature rise.' Volitional causation is somewhere in between: it is "neither prototypically direct nor prototypically indirect; thus it comes as no surprise that quite a number of examples of both doen and laten are to be found in this subclass" (Verhagen and Kemmer 1997: 72 For evidence that the causing event is non-punctual in get/persuade but not in make consider the natural collocation of the former but not the latter with adverbs such as finally:
The police finally got him to confess to the crime.
His lawyer finally persuaded him to confess to the crime. 
Scoring the causatives
In this section the causatives cause, force, have, get, make and persuade are scored for (semantic) binding. The argument is that the scores obtained (help) 'predict' their Present-day English complementation strategy: constructions with the highest binding scores are expected to be the ones taking the bare infinitive; constructions with lower scores, the to-infinitive.
The scale for each parameter ranges from 0 (lowest degree of binding) to 1 (highest degree). Most of the properties are binary, i.e. the value is either 0 or 1. The causation type and sphere of control scales, however, have three points. One should note that a rating of .5 is not only assigned to constructions that prototypically portray the situation corresponding to the middle point on such a scale (e.g. for the sphere of control, all constructions except have and force) but is also given to constructions that are more or less evenly distributed over the higher and lower values of some parameter (this is the case with the causation type semantics of make and force).
The parameters of the extended binding hierarchy are not all independent of each other. Unity of time, unity of space and direct vs mediated causation are interrelated, which is why typologists subsume them under a single heading, directness. There are also clear interdependencies among intendedness, sphere of control and causation type. The causing event can only be intended if the causer is animate (i.e. inducive/volitional causation). The SC parameter is only relevant in the context of inducive causation, as it is a social notion.
Furthermore +SC implies intended causation, as commands/instructions by definition reflect the will of the person in command. Since all three properties apply to the relation between causer and causee I call the macro-parameter "relationality".
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Directness and relationality could thus be conceived of as lattice structures. The construction based on cause is taken to prototypically represent indirect causation, often as measured on all three component properties, while the other causatives stand for direct causation. I will follow standard typological practice in not dividing up directness into its components when analysing the prototypical meanings of constructions.
Relationality is more complicated, with significant distinctions existing between the constructions, so here the components are kept strictly separate. Rather than setting up a lattice, I score the constructions for each subproperty of relationality. The total is then normalised to the same scale of 0-1, i.e. it is divided by 3. In this way the correct scores fall out automatically, avoiding the opacity of a lattice structure.
The results of the 3 macro-parameters are added up, allowing one to compare the sum totals (Table 3 , below). One should not expect the bare infinitive to be associated with one specific semantic binding value across the board, the to-infinitive, with a particular other value, nor to be able to draw an a priori boundary between values associated with either of the two strategies -see Givón's important relative notion of the form-function mapping:
If a point on the semantic hierarchy of binding is coded by a certain syntactic coding device, then a semantically higher point cannot be coded by a syntactically lower point. Rather, it will be coded either by the same coding point, or by a higher coding point on the syntactic coding scale. (Givón 1980: 370) With respect to the case at hand then, I hypothesise that no causative taking a toinfinitive should outrank any bare infinitival causative on the extended semantic binding hierarchy. (More universally: in a given language, a causative associated with a particular complementation pattern should not display a lower degree of semantic binding than a causative representing a syntactically less integrated construction; cf., however, Universal 4, below).
In order to determine the causation type and intendedness scores I carried out a comprehensive analysis of the causatives in the Freiburg-LOB Corpus of British English (FLOB), a one-million word corpus compiled in the 1990s. 12 The examples were not analysed in terms of directness because there is fairly general agreement in the literature that cause is the only causative that typically features absence of unity of time and space and presence of an intermediary party in the causal chain (recall that in subsection 2. The number of cause tokens is rather low, but the skewing in favour of the physical/affective types yields a score of 1. Force is scored .5 owing to its more or less equally strong association with inducive (minimal degree of semantic binding) and affective causation (maximal degree of semantic binding). The data suggest that get, have and persuade prototypically portray inducive causation, so they are scored 1. The total number is very low for have but it is virtually impossible to think of examples where causation is not interpersonal. In line with Dixon's statement that make is the most neutral causative (1991: 194, 294; 2000: 36-37) its results are truly mixed. A score of .5 reflects this.
As for intendedness, since the potential for an intended vs nonintended distinction only obtains if the causer is a mental entity my analysis is restricted to volitional/inducive examples. Table 2 , below, does not include cause since the low frequency of the volitional/inducive types (see Table 1 ) suggests that the combination with these types is very peripheral indeed. The evidence suggests that all constructions prototypically convey intended causation, giving scores of 1. Concerning make one might object that 11 per cent nonintended causation is not entirely insubstantial, but a proportion of intended causation of almost 90 per cent warrants the claim of prototypicality, especially since the total number of examples (i.e. 72) is far from insignificant. Table 3 presents the scores of the various causatives for all the parameters of the extended binding hierarchy, and includes the important sum totals. Given that have and make outrank the to-infinitive taking causatives, the binding hierarchy alone might seem to furnish a neat account of complementation. I believe that diachrony (frequency considerations) must also be taken into account, but let me first render explicit the three implicational universals underlying the correlations between the macroparameters directness, punctuality and relationality on the one hand, and complementation, on the other:
Implicational universal 1
If in a language there are differences in complementation strategies in causative constructions then a construction (prototypically) describing direct causation will display a higher degree of syntactic binding than one (prototypically) describing indirect causation (all other things being equal).
Implicational universal 2
If in a language there are differences in complementation strategies in causative constructions then a construction (prototypically) describing punctual causation will display a higher degree of syntactic binding than one (prototypically) describing non-punctual causation (all other things being equal).
Implicational universal 3
If in a language there are differences in complementation strategies in causative constructions then a construction (prototypically) describing situations featuring a high degree of relationality will display a higher degree of syntactic binding than one (prototypically) describing a low degree of relationality (all other things being equal).
The repeated stipulation that all other things be equal in order for the universal in question to work has manifestations on two levels. First, as the extended binding hierarchy is composed of three macro-properties the effect of any of these can be obliterated and even reversed by opposite scores on (one of) the two remaining factors. Second -and this is where diachrony comes in -, given the role of frequency in grammaticalisation, especially in compacting processes, different histories of constructions can also mess up the expected consequences of any and all of these universals. In fact this latter effect can be captured in a fourth universal:
Implicational universal 4
If in a language there are differences in complementation strategies in causative constructions then a construction with a high token frequency will display a higher degree of syntactic binding than one with a low token frequency (all other things being equal).
In Hollmann (2003: Ch.6 ) I work out the implications of this universal in detail, arguing, for instance, that the very high frequency of periphrastic causative make as compared to e.g.
cause always rendered the former likely to end up with a more, the latter, with a less compact complementation strategy. Moreover, I show how in combination with Fischer's (2000) reconstruction of the 'reversed' grammaticalisation of infinitival to universals 1-3 and 4 yield an explanation of the process whereby the once variable strategies came to be regulated by c1800.
Concluding remarks
The issue of infinitival strategies in English causatives and in other constructions  not accounted for satisfactorily in the formalist literature  has been discussed in a considerable amount of previous functionally oriented scholarship. In certain important respects the present approach is more conclusive. The cross-linguistic grounding of the present study gives it the edge over previous studies in terms of psychological plausibility. In addition, frequency effects have been taken seriously for the first time in this context, which is a considerable advantage, at least to the extent that one is persuaded by the usage-based model (Bybee 1985 , Langacker 1987 , Croft 2000 .
